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of communication may amount to clumsy and arbitrary deformation,
completely contrary to the basic policies of a free world order. (Loc.
cit. 1025-1026.)
Enough has been said to show that the Commission did not intend and
did not establish any "preclusionary hierarchy." But if there is any
danger of deformation, it could work both ways and not necessarily to the
detriment of a free world order. It may be that some policies and actions
of the United States may have appeared contrary to the ordinary meaning of the United Nations Charter or other relevant instruments to which
the United States is a party. Such cases have not come, and are most
unlikely to come, before an international tribunal. But if such a case
came before a tribunal, and if that tribunal, after studying the pleadings,
finally but not easily concluded that one or the other party was at fault,
is it really reasonable to expect such a tribunal to espouse an "interpretation of survival" in favor of that party which belongs to the free world?
Could such a tribunal be regarded as "impartial"? And, finally, is it
impartial when it is partial to the free world?

THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES BY TRIBUNALS
By Gidon Gottlieb
New York University School of Law

I
Objects, Purposes andZ Context
A year ago, at its first session, the Vienna Conference on the Law of
Treaties rejected a United States amendment to the draft articles on interpretation prepared by the International Law Commission. It did so
after hearing Professor McDougal's statement for the United States and it
did so by a massive vote. In his statement Professor MclDougal pointed
out that the purpose of the United States' amendment to these articles was
to eliminate the rigidities, restrictions and hierarchical distinctions
of draft Articles 27 and 28. The text of a treaty and the common
meanings of words would be made the point of departure of interpretation, but not the end of the inquiry. The text would be treated
as one important index among many of the common intent of the
parties. No fixed hierarchy would be established among the elements
of interpretation; the amendment of the United States sought to make
accessible to interpreters whatever elements might be significant in a
particular set of circumstances, including ordinary meaning, subsequent practice and preparatory work, but not excluding others that
might be also relevant.'
During the debate on the United States amendment, the representative
for the United Kingdom reminded the Conference that the Institute of
International Law had rejected the view advocated by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht that the primary aim of treaty interpretation was to ascertain the
1United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, First Session, Official Records
(1969), at 168.
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common intention of the parties, independently of the text if need be. He
observed also that parts of Professor McDougal's statement seemed to be
directed toward reviving the doctrine rejected by the Institute.
It has now been asserted on a number of occasions that the text must
be presumed to be the authentic expression of the intentions of the parties
and "that, in consequence, the starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investigation ab initio into the
intentions of the parties." 2 The Institute of International Law, the International Law Commission and the Vienna Conference have all adopted
the textual approach to treaty interpretation, objecting to giving too large
a place to the intentions of the parties as an independent basis of interpretation. It remains thus to consider what the proper role of an international tribunal is when it interprets treaties on the basis of the Vienna
Articles.
The problem that we discuss today is essentially a jurisprudential one.
And, rather than apologize for making an argument on the esoteric plane
of jurisprudence, I shall submit that the principal difficulties with theories
of interpretation and with the Vienna Articles arise precisely from a
failure to take into account some central conceptual requirements.
I would like first to talk about the relationship between texts and policies
or, to use the International Law Commission's terminology, between the
terms of a treaty and their object and purpose. This is a matter of importance, since the "object and purpose" provision in Article 27 provides
one of the few escape hatches from the confining pressures of strict textualism imposed by the Vienna Draft. But let me add at once that Articles
27 and 28 may very well be shown to provide considerable flexibility despite their heavy textual emphasis.
It has been asserted that every legal text must be applied in light of
its context and that to truncate texts from their objects is both irrational
and arbitrary. While the draft articles on interpretation refer to the
object and purpose of a treaty in general, it is not at all clear how courts
will be able to establish the object and purpose of a particular stipulation
without resort to preparatory work. Let me elaborate. Article 27, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Draft Articles provides:
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
According to the International Law Commission, this provision is designed to isolate and codify some general principles which appeared to
constitute general rules for the interpretation of treaties. 3 *While the function of this provision is clear-the general rule on interpretation is designed to guide interpretation-its objects and purposes are far from clear.
There is no handy preamble indicating the "object and purpose" of Articles 27 and 28, there is indeed nothing in the "ordinary meaning" of
the terms of the article itself to tell us what its object and purpose are
2 Ibid. at 177.
$ Report of the International Law Commission, General Assembly, 21st Bess., Ofacial
Reo rds, Supp. No. 9 (A/6309/Rev. 1) (1966) at 50.
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apart from the tautological statement that it is designed to guide interpretation. Nor is it clear that we may have recourse to the International
Law Commission's commentary otherwise than as permitted in Article 28
itself. Or, to put the matter differently, Articles 27 and 28 do not give
us much help in interpreting their own provisions. The International Law
Commission's intention to limit the means of interpretation which are admissible for ascertaining the intention of the parties is expressed only in
the preparatory work of the Vienna Treaty which under Articles 27 and
28 should not be looked at in normal circumstances.
My questions about the "object and purpose" of the provisions of
Article 27 echo the problem which has been the subject of the debate on
the role of purpose and policy in the application of law which has been
going on for more than ten years. This debate, which has a direct bearing on the work of the Commission, was among the mass of materials
ignored by the Commission which conducted its proceedings in quasihermetic isolation from work in other relevant fields.
It is frequently not enough to discuss the general object and purpose
of a treaty in order to obtain guidance about the application of one of
its provisions. Every stipulation in a treaty presumably has an object
of its own hopefully integrated with the broad aims or major purposes of
the treaty as a whole. Thus, in the famous Expenses case, the International
Court of Justice made reference both to the specific purposes of Article
17 of the Charter and to the general purposes of the Organization itself.
In its opinion, the Court pointed out that
The general purposes of Article 17 are the vesting of control over the
finances of the Organization, and the levying of apportioned amounts
of the expenses of the Organization in order to enable it to carry out
the functions of the Organization as a whole acting through its principal organs and such subsidiary organs as may be established.'
If the court's judgment in this case is suspect for some in this room as
an example of exuberant functional interpretation, let me cite from a far
older opinion of the Permanent Court in the Chorz6w Factory case:
For the interpretation of Article 23 account must be taken not only
of the historical development of arbitration treaties, as well as of the
terminology of such treaties, and of the grammatical and logical meaning of the words used, but also and more especially of the function
which, in the intention
of the Contracting Parties, is to be attributed
5
to this provision.
The functions which Contracting Parties attribute to specific treaty provisions-to individual articles-are generally expressed in the preparatory
work and not in the treaty itself. This is a matter of particular importance
for lawmaking treaties such as the U.N. Charter and the Vienna Draft
Articles themselves, which purport to lay down guidelines for international
tribunals and for foreign offices on fundamental international constitutional matters. Article 28, which restricts recourse to such preparatory
work, is destined to hamper the intelligent application of treaty provisions
informed by their stated purposes and objects.
4 [1962] LC.J. Rep. 151, 162.

5 P.C.., Ser. A, No. 9, p. 24 (1927).
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Lon Fuller has emphasized that if in some cases we seem to be able to
apply a rule without asking what its purpose is, this is not because we can
treat a directive arrangement as if it had no purpose, but rather because
we know the purpose "without thinking." He demanded that we be sufficiently capable, when we apply a rule, to put ourselves in the position of
those who drafted the rule to know what they thought the application ought
to be. Significantly, this is a point on which he is not contested by Hart
who has otherwise sharply opposed him on the relationship between purpose and meaning.
The concept of text, like the concept of rule which I have analyzed elsewhere, is inherently purposive. 6 Rules as here understood are one of a set
of devices for the guidance of processes of reasoning leading to decisions
and judgments. In this sense, treaty stipulations, especially those of lawmaking treaties, are clearly rule-like. Their dependence on objects and
purposes is not just a matter of judicial convenience or of professional
convention. The connection between textual guidance devices and their
objects, whether reduced to writing or not, goes to the very root of the
rationality of their use. The objects and purposes of a rule or its policy
are imbedded so to speak in the concept of rule itself and the opposition
of the one to the other is both misconceived and dangerous. It encourages
interpreters to turn either with excessive deference or with exaggerated
indifference to the guiding hand of written words. The connection between rules or texts and purposes is echoed in the interpretation of single
words. When an occurrence falls within the so-called penumbra of meaning of words in a rule or in a text, it is generally admitted that reference
to the purpose of the rule is required to determine whether the occurrence
should be governed by it. The purpose is then used to determine the inclusion or exclusion of marginal occurrences. For example, the applicability of the French term "navires" to steamships, when it had figured
in a treaty concluded at a time when only sailing vessels were in existence,
would depend on the objects which the stipulation was designed to promote.
It is suggested in modern linguistic philosophy that the meaning of a
word, its sense (not what it refers to), is a rule for the use of the word:
the connection between the meaning of words and their object is then apparent and manifest.
This characterization of rules and textual stipulations confirms the necessary reliance on purposes whenever they are applied or interpreted. Purposes and objects must be considered unless one is prepared to disregard
what it is that texts are designed to accomplish; unless one is prepared
to accept the possibility of the self-defeating application of texts or their
application in a manner not contemplated by their authors.
While the difficulties encountered in ascertaining and giving effect to
the objects and purposes of treaty stipulations are considerable, there is
little guidance to be had from the two draft articles. Mention of "preambles" in the context provisions of Article 27 is not helpful when we
look for the objects of particular terms.
6 Gidon Gottlieb, The Logic of Choice: An Investigation of the Concepts of Rule
and Rationality (1968).
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I have argued that reference to the objects and purposes of a text could
be required to guide its application in two separate sets of situations:
(a) when the events to which the text may be applicable fall squarely
within the penumbra of meaning of the words in the text; and (b) when
the events to which the text seems to apply fall squarely within the ordinary meaning of its terms.
Let me illustrate this point using a hypothetical example familiar to
legal theorists. The big Powers have agreed "to ban the access of military
vehicles to designated areas in Berlin." In speeches at the signing ceremony it was pointed out that the agreement would promote friendly relations and co-operation between the Occupying Powers by limiting the introduction of armaments into the city. Some time later local World War
II veterans decided to mount an old Wehrmacht tank on a pedestal as a
memorial to fallen comrades in a designated area of the U. S. Zone. The
Soviet Commander then protested that the introduction of the tank
amounted to a -violation of the "ordinary meaning" of the terms of the
agreement. I expect that under the International Law Commission's
commentary, when the ordinary meaning of words is clear and makes
sense in the context, there is no occasion to have recourse to other means
of interpretation. I expect that under such an interpretation the Soviet
contention could well be upheld and that recourse to the speeches made
at the signing ceremony would be resisted, since prohibition of the monument would be neither manifestly absurd nor unreasonable.
In this manner the hierarchical distinction between the elements mentioned in Article 27 and those of Article 28 could very well lead, as Professor McDougal has pointed out, to the imposition upon the parties of an
agreement they had never made. (I must incidentally point out to Professor Gross that Sir Humphrey Waldock expressly recognized a hierarchical distinction between the two articles; the commentary asserted
there was no hierarchical order merely as between the provisions within
7
Article 27).
In the Vienna spirit, which was, I understand, not only a textualist
but also an amending spirit, I would have moved the following amendment
to clarify the proper role of an international tribunal in interpreting
treaties:
1. that the words "object and purpose" in Article 27(1) be amended
to "objects and purposes";
2. that Article 28 be amended by the addition of two new sub-paragraphs

(c) and (d):
(c) Leads to a result not in conformity with the objects and purposes
of the stipulation interpreted; or
(d) Leads to a result not in conformity with the objects and purposes
of any relevant rule of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
7 Report of the International Law Commission, Zc. cit. at 51; and Vienna Conference
on the Law of Treaties, Zoo. cit. at 18.
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I trust, however, that it should be possible for tribunals to reach for
supplementary means of interpretation, including preparatory work, in
a wide range of circumstances even without the addition of these additional
provisions. As Sir Humphrey Waldock pointed out at the Vienna Conference, "There had certainly been no intention of discouraging automatic
recourse to preparatory work for the general understanding of a treaty." 8
This consideration lay behind use of the term "to confirm" in Article 28.
Article 28 thus permits the use of supplementary means of interpretation
in all cases "to confirm" the meaning resulting from the application of
Article 27. It opens the door wide to the use of such other means of interpretation and does much to relax the rigors of the provisions of Article 27.
II
Texts and Shared Expectations
The second point I would like to make touches on the role of texts in
the interpretation of agreements and on Professor McDougal's concept of
language and text. I believe that it lies at the bottom of his theory about
the goals and strategies of interpretation which have been so firmly opposed in Vienna.
Texts, in Professor McDougal's framework of inquiry, play a distinctly
secondary role. The conception of agreement as a process of communication involves, he says, viewing all signs and acts of collaboration between
the parties as an effort on their part to mediate all relevant subjectivities
of commitment. These are his terms. Communication, he adds, involves
the transmissionof signs through channels to targets or audiences with the
goal of mutual understanding on the part both of the sender and receiver
of the messages.
In the terminology of communication analysis the subjectivities of
communicator and audience are "mediated" by gestures, signals, and
languages. These mediating events are not subjective events; however, they are specialized to the inducing of such events. We speak of
them as "signs", such as the physical movements made in a "gesture"
of rejection, or the fire signal employed to indicate that the "enemy
sues for peace", or the spoken sounds uttered in saying "I agree".
The gesture, signal, and speech pattern constitute sign systems when
they call up relatively standardized symbol events, which are the subjectivities constituting the interpretation of signs.... Communication
is a sequence that we define as beginning with subjective eventsthe intention to participate in a given activity in a certain way-and
proceeding through expression-which consists in such non-subjective
events as using one's voice or shaking one's head-to the subjective
events eventually occurring in an audience, which are preceded by
physical orientation toward the channel and the transmission of sensory events to the brain. At any cross section in a communication
sequence an observer-participant must recognize that subjective and
non-subjective events occur simultaneously.9
s Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, ibid.

o MeDougal, Lasswell and Miller, The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public
Order at 37-38 (1967).
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If Professor MeDougal is right, if texts merely transmit the demands
and subjectivities of commitments, if they merely act as carriers for "subjeetivities," for the shared expectations of the parties, if they are to expectations what telephone lines are to electric impulses, then his impatience
with the textualist approach is indeed warranted. For, under his view,
the textualist interpreter concentrates on the instrument transmitting the
subjectivities of the parties rather than on the shared expectations themselves which should be the heart of the matter. The use of communication
theory as the foundation of his work on interpretation would necessarily
commit an interpreter to a study of what is being transmitted, to whom,
by whom, through what channels and with what effects rather than to a
study of the text of the message itself. From such perspective, reliance
on legal texts is then but one of a number of strategies for discovering the
shared expectations of the parties. The recommended task of interpreters,
according to this thesis, is deference to relevant expectations. Professor
McDougal is explicit on this score: "In the public order we recommend,
applier-interpreters must, therefore, be committed to primary interpretation, or the giving of deference to the genuine shared expectations of the
particular parties." And he makes quite clear that the text of a document is merely "one particular set of signs," one of many indexes to the
parties' shared expectations, and that a simple reading of "the final text,
while clearly indispensable, may often be of only limited assistance." 10
It contrasts with the traditional legal approach of deference to textual
provisions. Fidelity to legal provisions and deference to the expectations
of text-makers are very different matters. If the communication theory is
applicable and properly conceived for the study of language and interpretation, then, I submit, everything else follows and McDougal, Lasswell and
Miller's Theory of Interpretation is vindicated.
My difficulties, however, lie with their adoption of the communication
theory itself (not, I wish to emphasize, with their quite proper emphasis
Conceptual analysis
on the importance of context in interpretation).
inappropriate and
theory
is
entirely
would suggest that communication
out of place in the study of language and text. The injection of the irrelevant communication theory model merely blurs an otherwise masterful
legal analysis of judicial interpretation.
"Subjective events" cannot guide; headaches, memories, intentions, expectation and other dispositions and states of mind cannot be acted upon
by others, unless first expressed in words or agreed signs. But the converse is not necessarily true: sentences in legal instruments, to paraphrase
Gilbert Ryle, cannot always be interpreted as being "categorical reports
of particular but unwitnessable matters of fact"; they are "neither reports
of observed or observable states of affairs, nor yet reports of unobserved or
unobservable states of affairs. They narrate no incidents." 11 In other
words they do not report shared expectations, they do not stand for something or designate it in the way that a proper name does. They do not
describe either subjective or non-subjective events. Legal texts are in0 Ib. at 394, 396.
-1 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind at 125 (1949).
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tended not to report facts nor to "transmit" the shared expectations of
parties to audiences. They are intended to influence people, to guide
them, to direct them; or, to be more specific, to guide their reasoning, the
drawing of inferences towards choices, decisions, judgments and the like.
The goal of interpretation is submissive deference to such guidance with
due regard to its context and object.
Texts, however, are not the only device for guiding reasoning-other
agreed signs can also be relied upon. White smoke in the Vatican chimney
and Indian smoke signals can be acted upon by informed watchers, but
expectations and intentions, unless expressed, remain concealed and unknown.
In recommending as the primary goal of interpretation that decisionmakers undertake a disciplined, responsible effort to ascertain the genuine
shared expectations of the particular parties to an agreement, McDougal
emphasizes the inherent shortcomings in the capability of words to communicate shared subjectivities. I would argue, however, that the primary
goal of interpretation is to act upon the words, texts and other devices
agreed upon by the parties in light of their agreed and stated objects and
purposes, that is, with proper regard for context.
Professor McDougal is criticized therefore for conceiving of interpretation primarily as a process for ascertaining a "subjective event," the
shared expectation of the parties, rather than as a process for acting on
their agreed instruments for guidance. For him, interpretation is a process
of discovery. I would submit, however, that interpretation is much more
like the performance of a symphonic score (different conductors perform
a score with varying degrees of fidelity to the composer's expectations).
The notion that texts and signs of all sorts function as devices for guiding reasoning, for guiding inferences, is recognized among philosophers
influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein. It is analyzed in the work of Gilbert
Ryle, Peter Winch and H. L. A. Hart. The function of legal language
can best be understood by referring to the experience of being guided by
it. "Let us consider the experience of being guided and ask ourselves
what this experience consists in when, for instance, we follow instructions
in filling out a form or in playing a new card game." 12 Evidently texts
do not guide physical movements. "To use a Wittgenstein metaphor, they
are more like the letters of the alphabet which enable us to read. When
we use a text we allow our minds to be guided. We may not always understand what a mental process is, but surely we are familiar with what it
is to let our reasoning be guided. We can ask what it was, what took
place when we suddenly reached a conclusion." 13 This process is elusive,
since it involves the direct guidance not of physical movements but of a
process of reasoning required for the application of texts in concrete situations. I have pointed out elsewhere that, since a text permits a full range
of potential inferences, the problem for the interpreter is not to discover
11 The Logic of Choice at 66; and Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Proposition No. 172 (1953).
is Gidon Gottlieb, "The Conceptual World of the Yale School of International Law,"
21 World Politics 108 (1968), for a more omplete discussion of Professor McDougal's

thesis.
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the meaning of words, but is entirely different. It is to discover whether
the person to whom the words were addressed acted reasonably in choosing
and acting on one of many potential meanings. Often, parties to a treaty
who are unable to agree on a specific provision adopt vague language,
thus in effect postponing agreement and delegating to the interpreters the
responsibility for reaching an acceptable solution. The main problem of
interpretation, in other words, is to decide whether the inference drawn
in accordance with the text is authorized or required by it-to decide
,not what the meaning of words in the text is but whether the words
authorized the inference made in reliance on them. The problem of interpretation would in this view involve not discovering something in the text,
but finding guidance for its application. The problem of interpretation
involves finding guidance for the choice between the rival applications of
a text.
The consideration of purposes provides just such guidance. Frequently,
the preamble, the preparatory work and other textual evidence will turn
out to be the principal and most authoritative statement of the object and
purpose of a text. Texts have a capacity to guide not unlike that of road
signs, dancing partners or instructions on Campbell soup cans. When
states decide to guide each other and to guide interpreters through the
drafting and the adoption of texts, they decide not merely on the content
of an agreement but also on a mode of guidance. Article 2 of the Draft
Articles on the Law of Treaties defines treaties as agreements in their
written form. Their interpretation is an exercise altogether different from
the interpretation of the shared expectation of the parties.
Evidently it must now be recognized that states have expectations not
only about the implementation of international agreements. They also
have shared expectations about their interpretation. States now look to
the interpretation of the texts they adopt rather than to deference to
their shared subjectivities of expectations. This does not in any way mean
that context, objects and purposes, preparatory work and other relevant
materials are out of place in the interpretation of texts. What states want
is that their texts, their agreements be interpreted, not their shared subjectivities. If there ever was much doubt about this, it was dispelled by
the work of the Institute of International Law, the International Law
Commission and most recently by the Vienna Conference on the Law of
Treaties. Under international law, texts were always at least the starting
point of interpretation. Judicious resort to the travaux prparatoiresand
sensitivity to context must never permit the interpreter to lose sight of this
textual starting point. What is called for is not deference to the genuine
shared expectations of the parties to an agreement, but rather deference
to the agreement itself-text, context, objects and all.
III
Ordinary Meaning
In conclusion I would also like to express misgivings about the use of
the term "ordinary meaning" in the Draft Articles which was so appro-
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